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[发表时间]:2020-11-24 [浏览次数]:

讲座主题:The (biased) Wisdom from the Crowd



讲座地点:腾讯会议ID:724 498 620

嘉宾简介:周臻,清华大学五道口金融学院助理教授,纽约大学博士。研究领域:金融市场摩擦的理论研究和信息经济学,包括金融危机和监管、公司金融、系统性风险和金融网络等相关问题的研究。曾在American Economic Review等国际权威期刊发表论文。

内容摘要:This paper studies a collective decision-making scheme: each agent pays a fixed cost to participate in a project and receives a common value, only if the number of participantssurpasses a pre-specified threshold. When each agent has some dispersed private knowledge about this common value (individual wisdom) and makes the participation decision simultaneously, we find information aggregation is not efficient. In the unique monotone equilibrium, agents choose to participate even when their private information indicates otherwise. As such, some projects with value lower than the participation cost get initiated. We extend the model to show that this bias cannot be corrected when agents play the game dynamically with opportunities to learn from the past history of participation. We further apply the insights from our theory to three applications, namely, the All-or-Noting crowdfunding, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending, and excludable public good provision.